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“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes”1. Benjamin Franklin 
might have been right about death and taxes in 1789, but today the situation is very different, 
at least for taxes. The integration of national economies and markets has increased due to the 
recent rapid and expansive digital transformation, putting an enormous strain on the 
international taxation2. The weaknesses in the current rules have created opportunities for 
BEPS3, having led to a total loss of between 100-240 billion in lost revenues annually4. In the 
time to come, bold policy moves are required to restore the confidence in the system of 
international taxation, so that death and taxes, once again can be as certain as in 1789. 
 
In the writing of this thesis, I have done my fair share of pushing the boulder up the mountain 
only to see it roll down again5. Throughout the writing process, my supervisor, helped me 
whenever it was needed. I would also take this opportunity to offer my gratitude to my good 
friend and fellow student, Baard, for the suggestions on how to structure the thesis. Not to 
mention the patience of my dear, Nara, without whom I would not manage the countless 
studies, day and night. I would also like to thank my parents for having educated me and 
shown me the right path in life.  
 
What started out as an exciting topic of international taxation law, became a maze of 
unsolved questions, where every turn leads to a dead end. For every book, article, blog or 
forum post, my knowledge increased. The motto before going toe to toe with books such as 
“E-Commerce and source-based income taxation6” or the “E-commerce and the Effects of 
 
1 Franklin, Benjamin in a Letter to Jean-Baptiste Le Roy 13 November 1789. Available at 
http://www.notable-quotes.com/f/franklin_benjamin.html [Accessed 28. May 2020] 
2 To be concise, International means in this context the “international aspects of domestic laws”. 
Olivier and Honiball (2008) p. 1 
3 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting refers to tax planning strategies used by MNEs that exploit gaps 
and mismatches in tax rules to avoid paying tax. This definition is taken from the OECD website 
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about [accessed the 28th of May 2020] 
4 Figures are taken from the website www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about [accessed the 28th of May 2020] 
5Camus, The myth of Sisyphus. “Camus uses the Greek legend of Sisyphus who is condemned by the 
gods for eternity to repeatedly roll a boulder up a hill only to have it roll down again once he got it to 
the top, as a metaphor for the individual’s persistent struggle against absurdity of life” 
www.Britannica.com/topic/The-Myth-of-Sisyphus [accessed 5 June 2020] 
6 Pinto (2003) 
Technology on Taxation. Could VAT be a solution?”7 or reading the final report of the 
OECD on addressing the challenges of the digitalisation of the economy or the interim report 
of 2018 tax challenges arising from digitalisation was something as simple as “sic parvis 
magna”. Any great victory starts with a small step. 
 
In the thesis, my views on the new suggested rules on income taxation by the OECD 2020 
will come forth. The over seven-years long battle8 to ensure that profits are taxed where 
economic activities take place and value is created may soon be over. “Things fall apart, the 
centre cannot hold. [Action 1] is loosed upon the world”.9 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ADS - Automated Digital Service 
ALS - Arm’s length standard  
BEPS - Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
CFB – Consumer-facing Business 
MLI – Multilateral Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS 
MTC – Model Tax Convention of the OECD10 
PE – Permanent establishment 
R&D – Research and Development 




7 Bardopoulos (2015) 
8 The timeline starts from the release of the OECD BEPS report of 2013, in which the action plan of 
15 actions was adopted. (OECD (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en.) 
9 Adapted from “The Second Coming” by W.B. Yeats [Action 1] substituted [Mere anarchy] 
10 OECD (2017a), Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en. 
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The topic is how the digitalisation of the economy affects the tax sphere. Latest technological 
developments have flaunted the shortage of international tax rules capable of tackling the 
new difficulties due to the digitalisation of the economy. 
 
Recent reports by the OECD by the OECD11, UN 12 and other scholars 13 confirm the existing 
rules lack the flexibility to solve these issues of nexus, data and characterisation going 
beyond the scope of BEPS14. Highly digitalised MNEs profit from large user-bases, but are 
not taxed accordingly. The nexus rules based on physical presence and profit allocation rules 
based on the ALS are incompatible. There must be established nexus and profit allocation 
rules that are unconstrained by these deficiencies. 
 
The overall research topic focuses on whether the proposed solutions on nexus and profit 
allocation rules in the OECD (2020A)15 mitigate these insufficiencies in the nexus and profit 






11 OECD (2015), OECD (2018a), OECD (2019a), OECD (2019b) and OECD (2020a) 
12 UN (2017) 
13 Kasper, Owens and Sim (2020); Avi-Yonah and Kimberly (2019) 
14 OECD (2015) Para. 245 
15 OECD (2020a) pp. 8, 9 and 10 
1.2. Background 
Already in the 90s economists, Grubert and Mutti16 and Hines and Rice17 had started 
researching on BEPS. During 1990-2009, BEPS purportedly increased in scope according to 
Lohse and Riedel18, but as claimed by Clausing19, it increased. Clausing’s assertation was that 
the development of technology had permitted the increased entanglement of an MNEs 
corporate structure and thus opened for BEPS.20 
 
The TP methods of the ALS were becoming flawed.21 With the increasing distance between 
rules and reality, finding solutions became critical to ending the tax avoidance strategies by 
MNEs globally. The OECD took its first steps to combat BEPS in 2013.22 In the final 
report,23the OECD emphasized the technology’s facilitating role in allowing businesses to 
operate within the market jurisdiction without a physical presence. In 2018 the Task Force of 
the Digital Economy delivered an interim report, containing an in-depth analysis of the issues 
affiliated with the digitalisation of the economy.24 
 
In January 2019, the Inclusive Framework suggested a two-pillared proposal to tackle these 
challenges.25 Pillar one contained three proposals on new rules of nexus and profit allocation: 
The user participation, the marketing intangibles and the significant economic presence 
proposal (SEP). Pillar two contained a new proposal on Global anti-Base Erosion (GloBE). 
 
The Secretariat Proposal26 unified these proposals into a ”Unified Approach”, leading to the 
profit allocation rules Amount A, B and C and a new nexus proposal, primarily based on 
sales in the market jurisdiction. In January 202027the members of the Inclusive Framework, 
 
16 Grubert and Mutti (1991), pp. 285-293 
17 Hines and Rice (1994), pp. 149–182 
18 Lohse and Riedel (2013) p. 17. 
19 Clausing (2009) pp. 709-710 
20 Clausing (2009) pp. 709-710 
21 Avi-Yonah (2010) pp. 3-18 
22 OECD (2013) 
23 OECD (2015) para. 246 
24 OECD (2018a) chapter 2, 3 and 5 (para. 378-401). 
25 OECD (2019a) 
26 OECD (2019b) 
27 OECD (2020a) 
counting approximately 140 countries, agreed upon an outline of the design of Pillar one and 
expressed their ”strong support for reaching a multilateral agreement”.28, 29 
 
The members are committed to continuing the work towards a consensus-based long-term 
solution until the end of 2020. That is if it is not postponed due to the extraordinary 
circumstances and the significant downswings in most markets around the world. 
1.3. Purpose and scope 
The mainline of the research topic revolves around the legal aspects of the new taxing right, 
Amount A. In chapter 2, the author will analyse the rationale for the new nexus and profit 
allocation rules and compare them to the existing. The scope will be discussed using existing 
principles of international tax law as points of reference.30 Last, the author will mention the 
risk of double or multiple taxations in the interaction between Amount A, B and C. 
 
In chapter 3, the author will discuss the existing tax liability of non-resident companies, that 
will be in-scope under Amount A, cf. act 26 March 1999 No. 14 relating to the taxation of net 
wealth and income (hereinafter the taxation act) section 2-3 (1) letter b.31 Any country’s 
taxing rights must derive from domestic laws. Regardless of the conclusion on tax liability cf. 
section 2-3(1) letter b, the proposal of Petter Stordalen (2019) will be touched upon, and the 
author will outline the way forward. 
The scope of the thesis can be limited to these three key points: 
 
1) The reach and scope of the internal laws in the taxation act section 2-3 (1) letter b on tax 
liability for non-resident automatic digital services and the current regulation of nexus and 
profit allocation in the existing bilateral tax treaties.32 
 
28 OECD (2020A) para. 1 
29 See Appendix A, figure 1 to see the design of pillar one and pillar two 
30 OECD (2003) 
31 The English version is presumed to have the same content and shall be interpreted in the same way 
as Skatteloven 2-3(1) bokstav b. This is purely for academic reasons. (unofficial English translation 
by PwC) 
32 Only the tax treaties based on MTC will be in-scope 
 
2) The legal consequences of shifting from a principle of reference of physical presence to a 
principle of reference of active and sustained engagement, seen from the perspective of 
current international taxation principles and the rationale of existing rules and the shift from a 
separate entity accounting based on the ALS to the formulary apportionment-method. 
 
3) Legal issues as well as legal policy issues related to the method of implementation of the 
new nexus and profit allocation rules of Amount A. 
1.4. Sources 
In the de lege ferenda discussion of the new nexus and profit allocation rules of Amount A, 
the primary sources will be OECD’s sources.33 Other sources will be scholarly literature, 
opinions and reviews. 
 
In the de lege lata interpretation of Norwegian taxation law, the primary source is the taxation 
act. Other sources are the preparatory texts34, legislative intent, case law, tax practise, legal 
theory, international sources of law, other countries’ law and policy considerations.35 
Standard legal method. 
The MTC is the primary source of interpreting the bilateral tax treaties based on it. Since 
bilateral tax treaties are subject to international law cf. the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969 article 2: “[A] Treaty” is an “international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law” and article 1 “The present 
Convention applies to treaties between States”. Even though Norway has not ratified the 
treaty, most of its articles are customary international law 36 cf. ICJ-statutes article 38 letter b, 
such as article 31-33. Domestic laws also play a role, through the lex specialis rule in article 3 
(2) of the MTC. 
 
33 OECD (2020A), OECD (2019b). 
34 Ot.prp. nr. 86 (1997-1998) Ny Skattelov; Innst. O. nr. 40 (1998-1999) Innstilling fra finanskomiteen 
om ny skattelov ;Ot.prp. nr. 35 (1990-1991) 
35 Eckhoff/Helgesen (2001), pp. 73, 79 and 83. 
36 Or at least reflect customary international law. I.C.J Reports 1997, p. 66, para. 109 and I.C.J. 
Reports 1991, pp. 69-70 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Amount A – an increased taxing right to the Market State 
2.1. Introduction 
Amount A, B and C form a three-tier approach to allocating profits that have become 
significantly harder to allocate due to the digitalisation. Applied uniformly they should re-
stabilise the international tax system, ensure tax rule-consistency and simplicity. The OECD 
(2020a) contains the following description:37 
 
“Amount A – A share of residual profit allocated to market jurisdictions using a formulaic 
approach applied at an MNE group (or business line) level. This new taxing right can apply 
irrespective of the existence of physical presence, especially for automated digital services.”.  
 
“Amount B – A fixed remuneration based on the ALP for defined baseline distribution and 
marketing functions that take place in the market jurisdiction.” 
 
“Amount C – The return under Amount C covers any additional profit where in-country 
functions exceed the baseline activity compensated under Amount B. A further aspect of 
Amount C is the emphasis it gives to the need for improved dispute resolution processes." 
Amount B is a floor on the return attributable to the baseline physical marketing and 
distribution activities. Amount C applies the current TP to allocate profit exceeding the 
baseline activity. Amount C complements Amount B. Amount A, on the other hand, allocates 
the residual profits38 through a formulary apportionment method. 
 
37 OECD (2020A) para. 10 
38 Residual profits or non-routine profits is the profit that remains after Amount B (and Amount C) 
have been applied. 
 
Part 2.2 will discuss the scope of Amount A, part 2.3 will analyse the nexus rule and the 
increased taxing right to market States, part 2.4 will analyse the formulary apportionment 
method and compare it to the existing ALS, part 2.5 introduces remaining considerations to 
Amount A, and part 2.6 holds the conclusion. 
 
In the further, only Amount A will be treated explicitly. 
2.2. Scope of Amount A39 
2.2.1. Introduction to the scope 
Businesses in the scope of Amount A can have an active and sustained engagement in the 
economy of a market jurisdiction, “...through activities in, or remotely directed at that 
jurisdiction”.40 
 
The MTC separates between businesses with income from business activities with a 
“permanent establishment” and those without a “permanent establishment”. 41 The 
interpretation is based on the businesses and not their activities, thus no differentiation 
between businesses based on their degree of digitalisation or ability to operate in scale 
without mass. 
 
Amount A will apply to ADSs and CFBs, based on their business activities and not their 
business. The author partly disagrees with these changes. The SEP-proposal of OECD 2019a 
might have been a more balanced approach to tackling the challenges of the digitalisation of 
the economy, mostly in terms of its harmony with the Ottawa Taxation Framework 
Conditions (OTFC). The SEP-proposal will be used as a point of reference to understand the 
new suggested proposal in OECD (2020a). 42 
 
39 See Appendix A, figure 2 for an overview over the in-scope businesses 
40 OECD (2020A) para. 10 
41 An antithetic interpretation of Article 7 of the MTC 
42See Appendix B, Figure 1 for a complete assessment of the proposal’s compatibility with the OTFC. 
 
2.2.2. Analysis of the scope 
2.2.2.1. Automated Digital Services (ADS) 
In this analysis, the question is what constitutes an ADS. The OECD defines ADSs as 
“businesses that generate revenue from … automated digital services that are provided on a 
standardised basis to a large population of customers or users across multiple jurisdictions”.43 
Examples of in-scope businesses are cloud storage, online advertising and online search 
engines.  
 
The ordinary meaning of “customers or users” suggests it should be applied in B2B as well as 
B2C relations. A customer can be a business, a purchaser of advertising services. The 
definition excludes C2C-relations as only “businesses” are in-scope. 
 
The interpretation of standardised is unclear. One interpretation can mean beforehand readied 
services sold broadly to groups on a standardised basis. However, a focus on the 
standardisation of the services will undermine the value that is created by user interaction. 
Customers of Google cloud can, through an in-feature service add-on program called G-
suite44, customise their add-on features based on their specific preferences. Google is a highly 
automatized business that provides a service from a remote location, but the standardization 
comes at the user’s initiative. If Google collects user-data to customise data that they sell to 
advertising companies in the jurisdiction of the user, then this is not a standardization, but 
customization. Where the line is drawn between standardization and customization is unclear. 
 
The understanding of an automated digital service is that it applies a high degree of digital 
technology to accomplish a function or a workflow. It does not exclude partially automated 
 
43 OECD (2020A) para. 22 
44 See more at gsuite.google.com [Accessed 28 May 2020]  
businesses, but the higher degree of human interaction the less it will be “standardized”. Non-
automated digital services are out of the scope.  
 
Businesses requiring a high degree of human intervention and judgment such as legal, 
accounting, engineering, architectural or consulting services fall outside of the scope.45 If 
such services were to be standardized, they would fall within the scope if they apply to a” 
large population of customers or users across multiple jurisdictions”. Multiple means more 
than one and will if standardised cross-border services are offered from one country and 
purchased in the other - for example, through a smartphone application, where the degree of 
automatization and standardisation is high. To exclude them entirely would leave room for 
MNEs to fully automate consulting services using artificial intelligence that replaces human 
workload, thus obtaining an advantage over other automated businesses. 
 
It is also unfair for sectors that already are highly regulated like the financial services sector, 
more specifically, the gambling sector. Social media platforms, search engines and other like-
automated digital services are not as highly regulated as the gambling sector. First, the 
gambling sector needs to seek authorisation from a national regulator before it can operate 
within the jurisdiction. Second, it is already subject to sector-specific taxes. Why the OECD 
has included these types of services under the definition of ADS is a mystery and seems more 
politically than legally reasoned. 
 
The scope can be circumvented if businesses were to de-standardize their services or allow 
more-user interactive features in the creation of value. The author finds the scope of the ADS 
too fragile, and it might fall victim to tax avoidance strategies. Due to the word limit, the 





45 See (OECD) 2020 para. 23 
2.2.2.2. Consumer-Facing Businesses (CFB) 
In this analysis, the question is what constitutes a CFB. It should “[...] cover businesses that 
generate revenue from the sale of goods and services of a type commonly sold to consumers, 
i.e. individuals that are purchasing items for personal use and not for commercial or 
professional purposes.”46 It should also ” bring into scope businesses that generate revenue 
from licensing rights over trademarked consumer products and businesses that generate 
revenue from licensing a consumer brand (and commercial know-how) such as under a 
franchise model”. 
 
That should include this non-exhaustive list of businesses (a few are mentioned):  
”personal computing products … franchise models, such as licensing arrangements involving 
the restaurant and hotel sector and automobiles”.47 The author will only look at businesses 
generating revenue through the sale of goods and services, as there is no room to also treat 
franchise models. 
 
The understanding of “[...]the sale of goods and services of a type commonly sold to 
consumers...” opens for both direct and indirect sales to consumers. The focus is on the 
“goods and services”, cf. “of a type commonly sold to consumers”, meaning that it is not the 
buyer that determines if a business is in scope, but the goods and services. What commonly is 
sold to consumers is not a fixed point of reference, as there can be country-based differences, 
region-based differences and geographically based differences. “Commonly sold” may, 
therefore, not be a precise reference. If understood subjectively by each interpreting taxing 
authority, each sale to a consumer will be subject to a discretionary assessment, where the 
contractual agreement between the retailer and the buyer will be decisive for whether the 
non-resident company becomes in-scope. The author insists on adding details on how to 
perform this interpretation in, for example, the OECD commentary as a business that 




46 OECD (2020A) p. 11, para. 27 
47 OECD (2020a) para. 28 
The OECD's statement that most of the B2B, extractive and commodities industry shall be 
carved-out,48 is debatable from the point of view of neutrality. Oil becomes gasoline, which is 
sold to consumers at gas stations. Wheat becomes bread, which is sold to consumers at 
supermarkets. The value of the oil would diminish if there were not any market for gasoline. 
The idea is that extractive or commodities companies may be taxed in the market States, 
where they sell their products in the manufactured form. Oil (extractive) and pipelines 
(commodity), however, need to be manufactured before they can be useful to a consumer 
because in their raw form they do not constitute “goods ... that are commonly sold to 
consumers”. The extraction of natural resources is also heavily reliant on the labour force in 
the source State, and the sale of it is heavily reliant on the labour force in the market State. 
Gasoline must be sold in gas stations. Gas stations are also taxed for the gasoline they sell, in 
Norway at approximately a rate of 60 per cent. Supermarkets are taxed for the bread they sell, 
through income tax and VAT. 
 
Furthermore, most countries regulate the extractive industries through contractual 
agreements, where the State stays in control of the resources. The result of an extra tax on the 
manufactured product of oil (gasoline), would result in double taxation of the oil company. 
(taxed for the extraction in State A, and for the sale of the manufactured product in State B) 
The State is also heavily involved in the taxation, direct control and to a great extent the 
managing of the national resources.  
 
The B2B business can only be out of scope if the goods or services are not” commonly sold 





48 See OECD (2020a) para. 30 
2.2.3. SEP-proposal 
The author instead favours the significant economic presence proposal (SEP) of the OECD 
(2019a). In-scope businesses of the SEP generate revenue by "(1) the existence of a user base 
and the associated data input, (2) the volume of digital content derived from the jurisdiction, 
(3) billing and collection in local currency or with a local form of payment, (4) the 
maintenance of a website in a local language, (5) the responsibility for the final delivery of 
goods to customers or the provision by the enterprise of other support services such as after-
sales service or repairs and maintenance, or (6) sustained marketing and sales promotion 
activities; either online or otherwise to attract customers.49  
 
SEP would be a better solution in terms of scoping more broadly, but still targeting the digital 
presence. It targets the presence of a business instead of specific business activities and does 
not differentiate between digital and non-digital activities, nor between sub-sectors of digital 
companies, such as online marketplaces, search engines and other digital companies. In terms 
of not violating the already existing principles of taxation in the OTFC, such as flexibility, 
neutrality, efficiency, certainty and simplicity, the significant economic proposal constitutes a 
more appropriate scoping rule.  
2.2.4. Summary 
The definitions regarding the scope of Amount A lack rationale, objectivity and clarity. 
Interpretations based on subjectivity, arbitrariness and country-based preferences, may 
increase the unclarity. The trade-off for a scope that addresses the non-routine returns are 
imprecise definitions.  
 
The weakness in the definition of ADS lies in the word “standardized”, because it opens for 
tax avoidance strategies. It has a clear delimitation towards customised services, that might 
also generate revenue from a market jurisdiction. It does not adequately state the degree of 
human intervention that will make the business out-of-scope. 
 
 
49 OECD (2019a) 
The separation of the two in-scope categories between ADS and CFB does not seem 
plausible. The author suggests including all businesses, apart from extractive and 
commodities industries and financial services sectors, limiting the differentiation and creating 
fewer market distortions. All businesses that are presumed to be in the same sphere shall be 
treated equally. The primary focus should be on the ability to operate from abroad without 
physical presence and have an active and sustained engagement in the market jurisdiction, 
more aligned with the SEP-proposal. The work is, however, still in progress and the OECD 
also states that “further work will be needed on the definitions of some of the key terms 
identified above”.50 
 
2.3. Nexus rule of Amount A51 
2.3.1.  Introduction 
The nexus rule is different for ADS and CFB. For both, it is based on indicators of significant 
and sustained engagement with market jurisdictions.52 Moreover, it shall be a stand-alone 
rule, applicable only to the new taxing right. 
 
For ADSs, the only requirement for nexus is a revenue threshold based on local sales in the 
market jurisdiction. For CFBs, there must be a combination of the cross-border sale of 
tangible goods and significant and sustained engagement. The OECD states that “cross-
border sale of tangible goods is not in itself enough to constitute a significant and sustained 
engagement in that jurisdiction.”53 
 
Any tax should be contrasted with the overarching principles and guidelines, such as, for 
example, neutrality, flexibility, inter-nation equity and efficiency. In the next parts, the author 
will attempt to find the rationale behind an increased taxing right to the Market State by 
 
50 OECD (2020) para. 29 
51 See Appendix A, figure 2 to see the threshold at different levels 
52 OECD (2020A) para. 36 
53 OECD (2020A) para. 39 
looking at the origins of international tax law and the fundamental theories and principles on 
which it is built. 
2.3.2. Increased taxing to the Market State 
2.3.2.1. Historical overview 
International taxation law is meant to regulate the international aspects of domestic taxation 
laws. Taxation remains within the fiscal sovereignty of countries, but when for example a 
company operates both in its residence State and another State, the countries must come 
together to divide the taxing rights between them in a manner that benefit each country.  
There are two primary principles of international taxation law, namely the residence principle 
and the source principle.  
 
The resident principle justifies a right to taxation based on a nexus between the tax subject 
and the State. Usually, this is regulated in the domestic laws of the country. In Norway, the 
regulation thereof can be found in section 2-1 (1) and 2-2. Businesses have a residence when 
they are” resident” cf. 2-2(7). A resident company’s tax liability “applies to all wealth and 
income in Norway and abroad” cf. 2-2(6). 
In the MTC a resident company is liable to tax” by reason of his domicile, residence, place of 
management”. 
 
The source principle justifies a right to taxation based on the nexus between the tax object 
and the State. This nexus can be economical or territorial. The source state is the “state that in 
some way or other is connected to the production of the income in question, to the state 
where value is added to a good... and the country in which the business conducts its trade and 
earns its income is usually referred to as the source country”. 54 Others justify source taxation 
because the income of the MNE derives partly from its use of a State’s infrastructural 
advantages. 
 
54 Pinto (2003) p. 48 - The opinions of Vogel, Klaus. 
 
The principle of source taxation is regulated domestically in section 2-3 of the taxation act in 
Norway. In the OECD, it is related to PE in article 7, defined in article 5. The OECD 
Commentaries remark that “...it reflects the international consensus that, as a general rule, 
until an enterprise has an [PE] in another State, it should not properly be regarded as 
participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that the other State 
should have taxing rights on its profits.55 
 
The underlying theories of the source taxation are the benefit theory, the entitlement theory 
and the principle of economic allegiance. The benefit theory is basically that the taxpayer and 
the State benefit from each other. The taxpayer exchanges something of value in return for 
something of value, because he receives benefits such as public goods and services for the tax 
paid. The entitlement theory is based on the source State’s entitlement to exclusive taxation 
rights on tax income generated within its geographical borders. The economic allegiance 
theory builds upon the idea of an obligation toward the “origin of wealth”, more specifically 
that a taxpayer has an obligation to the State, from where its income derives.56 
2.3.2.2. Why should the market State be given an 
extended taxing right? 
Why should the market State be allowed to tax the income deriving from a business that has 
no physical presence in the country? The benefit theory does not give any answer.  The 
increased economic nexus to a State’s economy is an argument for an extended taxing right 
to the Market State under the principle of “origin of wealth” and “the entitlement theory”, 
because both underline that any business should pay taxes from the country from where the 
money derives. 
 
Skaar argued that even if a business does not have a physical presence in the source country, 
it can still benefit substantially from its infrastructure and should contribute by way of 
taxation. PE is merely a piece of evidence of economic allegiance, not the reason for source-
 
55 OECD Commentaries to article 7 nr. 11 
56 For a more detailed explanation: Devereux. and Vella (2014); Pinto (2003) pp. 22-23 
state taxation.57 The politically agreed insertion of the PE in both the MTC and the UN model 
tax conventions does not fully support the arguments of Skaar. 
 
A critical factor in the determination of tax liability is risk-taking. Where did the company 
perform risk-taking economic activities? If it was in the source State, that indicates source 
taxation and the opposite if it was in the residence State. The question is why, should the 
market State be allowed to tax income if all the R&D (risk-taking) has been performed in the 
residence State? The highly digitalised businesses rely on the value-creation using their 
algorithms (intangibles), and this value can also be said to derive from the residence State.  
Giving the market States an extended taxing right might underestimate the value of 
investments and limit the company's opportunities to develop. The ability-to-pay principle 
should be kept in mind when distributing the overall tax burden. A company with high costs 
of R&D might not be capable of paying the taxes imposed on it. The ability-to-pay principle 
should, in those cases function as a proxy of equality. 
 
Tax fairness is an absolute factor that must be considered in any interpretation of tax law. To 
impose taxes on companies must be done fairly and equitably, be it built on the principle of 
economic allegiance, the benefit principle, the entitlement theory or the ability-to-pay 
principle. All in all, it is hard to build the exact reasoning of the market State’s right to tax 
based on historical principles, mostly because businesses operating within a jurisdiction 
without any physical presence are a new phenomenon. 
2.3.3. Permanent establishment 
This subparagraph will discuss the de lege lata scope of the PE. 
Article 5 paragraph 1 gives the general definition of the term PE, enshrined in Article 7 of the 
MTC: “the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through which 
the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.” 
 
 
57 Skaar (1991) p. 559-560 
The definition contains the following conditions:58 
1) There must be a “place of business”, I.e. a facility such as premises or, in certain instances 
machinery or equipment59 2) “The place of business must be “fixed”, I.e. it must be 
established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence”603) The business of the 
enterprise must be carried on through this fixed place of business. 
In paragraph 2 the term lists up from a-f of examples of places of business, each of which can 
be regarded as constituting PE under paragraph 1 if they meet the requirements.61 
 
The term place of business covers any premises, facilities or installations used for carrying on 
the business of the enterprise whether they are used exclusively for that purpose.62 
Furthermore,” a place of business may also exist where no premises are available or required 
for carrying on the business of the enterprise and it simply has a certain amount of space at its 
disposal”63 
 
The MTC refers to “a place of business” within the country, harmonizing with the idea that 
sufficient physical presence was a threshold for tax liability.  Both the ADSs and CFBs 
operate from a remote location without any place of business.  
 
The main problem is that the MTCs only solution to tax digitalised businesses is to tax them 
using the location of the server to establish PE. 64 Under the current rules of the MTC, a 
company X (digital service multinational company) with a server only in Norway, will only 
be liable to pay taxes in Norway, even if it is subject to taxation in other countries if Norway 
has corresponding bilateral tax treaties. 
 
 
58 OECD (2017) 
59 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 6 
60 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 6 
61 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 45 
62 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 10 
63 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 10 
64 OECD Commentaries article 5, nr. 125 
There are two main problems with the definition as it is now.  
First, a remotely operating MNE may not operate a server in the tax jurisdiction. Digital 
companies also apply a method, called load-shedding, meaning that the user request is 
processed through several servers, whereas the business activity will take place within many 
jurisdictions. Not consistent nor long enough to constitute PE in the respective case. Should 
Norway be able to tax Google (the parent company) for value that went through maybe six 
different sub-sections of a firm, or somewhat independent ones and six servers in six different 
jurisdictions? Under the current PE, the answer is a definite no. 
 
Second, if it does operate from a server within the country, a digital service company can 
quickly shift its server from country A to country B, then from country B to country C, before 
it amounts to being ” fixed”. Often users may also be directed to other servers through a 
function called load-balancing if the Norwegian server was under a heavy workload at the 
time of the transaction. Then the operation will be performed by a server in Germany, and if 
the contract is concluded in Germany, then Germany would have the taxing right under 
current rules. 
 
The traditional income tax provisions dismally lack the flexibility to be applied effectively. 
The concept of physical presence and the virtual world are two opposites. The changes that 
were effectuated by action 7 were modest, reducing the ability to use the preparatory or 
auxiliary exception to the PE rule or enforcing regulations on the agent rule. Businesses can 
avoid this by re-routing the core activities to servers in low-tax jurisdictions and keep the 
auxiliary activities on servers in high-tax jurisdictions. 
 
In the next paragraph, the author will analyse the new nexus rule from the perspective of 
ADS and CFB. The author has a proposal based on the significant economic presence 
proposal in OECD (2019a) as a solution for the CFB nexus. 
2.3.4.  Analysis of the nexus rules of Amount A 
2.3.4.1. Automated digital services 
A threshold test on the sale of automated digital services on a standardised basis to a large 
population of customers or users across multiple jurisdictions is the nexus rule for ADS. The 
nexus threshold is suggested at a gross revenue of EUR750M, avoiding unnecessary 
compliance costs for smaller businesses. The OECD also states in paragraph 35 of OECD 
(2020a) that even for in-scope MNE groups a further carve-out may be considered for 
businesses “where the total aggregated in-scope revenues are less than a certain threshold”. 
There will also be additional local thresholds. 
 
The use of a sales-nexus is not a new concept. In several US states, they have collected taxes 
from remote sellers with no physical presence within the specific State. The U.S Supreme 
Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.65 even upheld the constitutionality of a South Dakota 
statute requiring remote sellers to register, collect and remit sales taxes if they met the 
threshold of either $ 100.000 in South Dakota sales or 200 transactions with South Dakota 
customers.66 
 
However, there are several issues with a sales-based threshold as a nexus rule. First, several 
points of transaction will be hard to identify. At some of these points, one might encounter 
independent enterprises that are in a contractual relationship with the provider of a service. 
Will the rules be applied bilaterally between the country that issues the initial transaction and 
the end-client in the receiving State or will the ADS be required to report the actual amount 
of revenue, which is sourced from jurisdiction A or B, minus what went to the intermediate 
enterprise (out-of-scope third party distributor)?  The details of this cannot be fully assessed. 
A solution might be to add the total amount of sales in the jurisdiction to the threshold and 
solve it through a deduction in the residence State, at least simplifying the nexus test.  
 
 
65 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) 
66 See Zaiken (2020) et. al.., for a thorough analogy review vis-à-vis Pillar 1 
It is manageable for most tax authorities to identify the primary points of distribution within a 
given supply chain. It becomes increasingly complex, however, to identify the activities 
conducted by third parties. According to the OECD (2020A), there should be a global 
threshold test and a local nexus test, but how the revenue-sourcing principles will differ from 
the conventional ones is still unclear. In the case of Virtual Private Networks, the information 
will be inaccurate, since the IP will be different from the actual one67.  
 
Applying only a sales-formula will, on the other hand, give a consistent approach that will 
provide predictability for the business, instead of several factors of nexus, such as assets and 
payroll. Such nexuses may lead to MNEs diverting their workforce to low-income countries.  
 
Another question relates to where the sale is concluded. In Norway, because the user is in 
Norway, or where the contract is "signed”? The digital advertising is offered by Google (from 
a server abroad) and accepted by a customer in Norway. The conclusion of a contract is the 
agreement, which automatically occurs when the customer in Norway has paid his amount or 
agreed to being charged based on cost per click (CPC) on advertising services or cost per 
thousand impressions (CPM). All these services are brought to Norwegian customers, and the 
value of the advertisement is based on the user-data collected on Norwegian end-users of 
search engines or digital platforms. If a location-based sales threshold is to be applied, the 
risk of VPN-use is still high. Rules on revenue sourcing must be clear, especially in terms of 
sale of advertisement, so that companies cannot increase the sales in low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
If businesses are required to collect data on the non-paying users' location, this might violate 
GDPR68 or data privacy regulations in domestic laws. Users would, in this case, need to 
consent to effectively being tracked and located for identification. It is uncertain exactly how 
the OECD will do it, but the author suggests an allocation to the country of the advertiser if 
 
67 This is important since the IP provides information on whether the customer performed the 
transaction from State A, B or C. 
68 See EU General Data Protection Regulation GPDR article 5 letter e 
that is the first third party customer. That seems better than tracking the “eyeballs” suggested 
by the OECD. 69 
 
Another problem is if a company is both CFB and ADS. The OECD distinguishes between 
the nexus requirements for each. For ADS, the only nexus is that they reach a threshold based 
on sales, and the nexus of the CFB is still being developed. The author suggests that such a 
company becomes wholly considered as a CFB for taxing purposes, providing a clear and 
consistent rule. Another solution would be to split the revenue and apply it to two different 
thresholds. Such an approach would be inefficient, inconsistent and burdensome, contrary to 
the OTFC. 
2.3.4.2. Consumer-facing businesses 
A CFB will have a nexus if it reaches a sales threshold and if it has an active and sustained 
engagement in that jurisdiction. Since the OECD has not published a final design, the 
evaluation of the rules is difficult. 
 
Some starting points would be that tax should be levied on profits/losses, not on revenue. 
VAT applies to revenue. The revenue is the total amount of earnings before all expenses are 
calculated. If taxpaying jurisdictions can separate taxes subject to VAT and the new amount 
A, however, there will be no problems of collision.70 
 
Furthermore, another problem of sales-nexus is to drill through the layers of systems in order 
to identify the final customer. A puma shoe is sold through a third-party reseller first from 
Germany to France to Algerie. Is the system supposed to be applied at every step throughout 
the supply chain like VAT is or will it be more like a retail sale, that is applied at the final 
point of sale, between France and Algerie.  
 
 
69 See OECD (2020A) p. 13, para. 41 
70 If similar changes are done to the domestic laws to accommodate the changes of Amount A. 
Is the German company legally bound by tax authorities to track their goods being sold? This 
would depend on the contractual relationship between the German and the French company, 
but such an approach will prove very challenging as the goods will change hands multiple 
times before it ends up in the consumer’s hands. This might even lead to the use of unaudited 
figures to ascertain the sales allocation key, which is unrealistic. A solution can be to follow 
the VAT-regime.71 
 
Can the SEP solve the nexus problematics? 
Initially, the significant economic presence proposal was a mixed nexus and profit allocation 
proposal. In this regard, the author will attempt only to display the nexus and threshold parts 
of the SEP. 
 
Since it will only be applied to the CFBs in this essence, we must reform its nexus. The 
author suggests that there should be similar factors that will make the presence of a CFB 
significantly enough to create a nexus. If we keep the sales approach and add the following 
six alternatives for a sustained engagement, the CFB will have to comply with what was 
outlined in the OECD 2020.  
 
The consequence will be that more businesses in the ADS will fall in under the CFB-scope 
and thus be subject to the CFB-nexus, but the author notes that this is a better approach. Not 
only does it harmonize better with the Ottawa Taxation Framework in terms of neutrality and 
flexibility, but since the leap from the principle of reference to physical presence will be less, 
reaching a consensus might prove less difficult.84  
 
The SEP has significant advantages in terms of neutrality, because it targets the presence of a 
business instead of specific business activities, proving a balancing factor of the taxation 
system. Such a non-discriminative approach is preferred by the author. 
 
71 See for example, OECD (2017) See the definition of consumer and customer status, as well as the 
simplified VAT registration regime for foreign vendors supplying B2C digital services cross-border. 
 
Its broad scope might, however, lead to businesses being tax liable in jurisdictions, in which 
they have not decided to operate, which will be the case for many digitalised companies. 
Uber has support centres that are in countries, where they do not engage in the daily business, 
such as Uber Eats and the ridesharing. The local revenue thereof will be calculated into the 
total revenue sum, even though this may seem very unreasonable. 
 
One might risk having a considerable amount of users and customers in a local jurisdiction 
providing for a certain amount of value creation, disregarding the costs of development and 
the negative consequences of returns, tax compliance and other determinative factors that 
may result in negative value creation, albeit, that the threshold is reached. In other words, 
would it be fair if the market State taxed a company with high research and development 
costs in the parent country, without deducting costs and expenses? The answer to that must be 
no because it will increase the overall tax burden of those companies. 
 
The SEP operates different thresholds, and it is highly suitable for the diversified number of 
contributions by users, customers and consumers in the digitalised economy. One of its 
strengths is that it first defines the presence and then seeks to attribute profits. It can be based 
on existing legal tools, and instead of breaking with the concept of PE establishment, a 
bending of the rules seems possible. 
 
The proposal applies to a vast number of non-resident countries with a digital PE 
establishment concept that can achieve equal taxing rights and non-discrimination between 
the digital companies and the brick and mortar economy. The proposal can also be 
implementable in developing countries that have a weaker tax administration. An expansion 
of the PE establishment concept makes it flexible in terms of changes in the structure of the 
digital multi-sided business models. In terms of (intra-nation)fairness, it gives the taxing 
powers to the jurisdiction where the company has the user-base, performs the sales or the 
contracts. It does also fully consider the mentioned multi-sided business model's use of 
algorithms and artificial intelligence in the value creation of a non-resident company. 
 
2.3.5. Summary 
Amount A will give the taxing powers to the jurisdiction where the sales are registered for 
ADS or where there is a sales nexus and active and sustainable engagement for CFB. For 
ADS, VPN-distortions may give inaccurate results, due to the insecurity of the user’s actual 
location. For CFB, the primary issue is to achieve fairness when using intermediaries. If the 
first company should be tax liable for the second company’s interactions with the third parties 
(customers), it will not harmonize well with the OTFC. A material threshold on global and 
local revenues can enhance the efficiency in the collection of taxes. The PE-concept is flawed 
as it is now, but the SEP might offer a better solution through the expansion of the PE 
concept, making it able to address constant changes in the business models of MNEs. The 
problem of distancing the rule from the principles of the OTFC to creating a nexus rule that 
will scope more income is not suggestable. 
2.4. Profit allocation rules of Amount A 
2.4.1. Introduction to formulary apportionment 
Amount A is based on a formula that will identify the portion of residual profits, which 
should be allocated to “eligible” market jurisdiction. 
 
The quantum of Amount A will in contrast to the separate entity approach of the traditional 
TP rules based on the ALS, be based on a calculation of the tax base on a measure of profit 
(before tax – PBT) derived from the consolidated group financial accounts.72,73 
 
 
72 OECD (2020A) paragraph 43 
73 A consolidated financial statement in this regard, is basically only a financial statement of the entire 
group earnings. 
The profit apportionment is performed through four steps, where the profit margin is z %, the 
non-routine profits are y %, the profit attributable to the eligible market jurisdictions are w %, 
and other factors such as trade intangibles will be v %. 
 
The first step is to calculate the whole tax base (PBT), which is derived from the consolidated 
group financial accounts - z %. Second, through an analysis of routine and non-routine 
profits, the total amount is split into x %, the deemed routine profit and y %, the deemed non-
routine profit. The third step is to distinguish between different profits; one distinction is, for 
example, between trade and marketing intangibles. The market jurisdiction profits w % is 
then separated from the total deemed non-routine profits, v %. Last, the remaining amount is 
what constitutes the new taxing right of Amount A, and this can be allocated to market 
jurisdiction by an allocation key, based on the number of sales of an MNE in the given 
market jurisdiction. 
 
Therefore, the author would like to be very precise in the interpretation of the newly 
introduced formulary apportionment and that the ALS will still be applied, but for the 
Amount A. The historic background will be given in 2.4.2.  In 2.4.3, the advantages and 
disadvantages will be discussed. In 2.4.4 the author will analyse the new formulary 
apportionment-rule from a legal point of view. The summary will be given in 2.4.5 
2.4.2. History of profit allocation rules 
Researchers have traced the origins of ALS to the 1920s. With time the ALS was manifested 
in article 9(1) of the OECD model tax Convention. 
 
The ALS was drafted in 1963 and adopted by the OECD Council on 11 April 1977 as article 
9(1) in the MTC. Now the ALS states that: “...Where conditions are made or imposed 
between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for 
those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.”74 
 
The application of the ALS depends on determining the conditions that independent parties 
would have agreed in comparable transactions in comparable circumstances. Such 
comparable factors can be the contractual terms of the transaction, the risk taken, or assets 
used, in-market economic circumstances or the business strategies pursued by the parties.  
 
OECD has already made changes to the understanding of PE (action 7) with article 5.4(1) and 
added according explanations in the commentary. As a part of action 8,75 the mandate of the 
BEPS released additional guidelines to approach Hard-to-Value Intangibles more 
appropriately. Under action 10,76 the OECD added further guidance on when the profit split 
method may be relevant. Under action 10, guidance on when to apply the profit split if 
business operations cannot be evaluated in isolation from each other. A new TP Guidance on 
financial transactions on Actions 4 and 8-10 was newly published in February 202077. The 
changes did not strengthen the ALS enough to allocate the non-routine profits, as there are no 
comparable relations to apply the TP methods. 
 
Nevertheless, neither formulary apportionment nor ALS is infallible. The OECD has wanted 
to introduce the formulary apportionment, but also keep the ALS for situations where it is 
still useful. As mentioned before, the new system will create two systems for taxation. One 
that follows the three-tier system applying formulary apportionment for Amount A and the 
ALS for Amount B and C, and one that follows the rules of the old TP guidelines based on 
the ALS, if none of the Amounts are applicable. 
 
74 Letter a and b are cut out as they are anyway consumed by the add-on, cf. ”in either cases ..” 
75 OECD (2018b) 
76 OECD (2018c) 
77 OECD (2020b) 
2.4.3. Advantages and disadvantages of formulary 
apportionment 
The new profit allocation rule is the formulary apportionment, which often was criticised for 
its arbitrariness. Some believe it would tilt revenues away from developing countries toward 
countries with vibrant markets, that it completely abandons the ALS on which the tax system 
has been based for almost a decade and that it would usually lead to a disproportional 
administrative burden in comparison to the revenue tax that States get.78 The author finds this 
criticism too extreme in this situation, as the formulary apportionment only will be applied 
for Amount A. 
 
Those who advocate for the use of formulary apportionment acknowledge that it is inherently 
arbitrary, but not to a greater extent than the ALS because formulary apportionment is, I.e. 
less susceptible to manipulation by intra-MNE contractual arrangements.79 
 
Since the formulary apportionment applies a global revenue threshold, MNEs would need 
only to file the detailed returns on which the calculation shall be based. This will reduce the 
tax system’s complexity because a country-by-country based income allocation would not be 
relevant anymore.  
 
Due to lack of space, the author stops here but recognizes that there are many more 
arguments pro and contra for the application of formulary apportionment. One can be its clear 






78 See more Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2019) 
79 See Avi-Yonah (2010) p. 14 
80 See more in Avi-Yonah (2010) pp. 6,19 and 22. 
 
2.4.4. Analysis and discussion of Amount A 
The first step is to calculate the whole tax base (PBT), which is derived from the consolidated 
group financial accounts z %. Amount A is a separate reallocation mechanism that does not 
change existing calculation methodologies and TP. The author suggests that the parent 
jurisdiction calculates and files detailed returns. If a tax authority would like an estimate of 
the tax base, simplified returns can be filed in the relevant local market State. Information 
exchange on request should be mandatory, provided that a detailed calculation addresses the 
tax base adequately. 
 
The starting point is the whole tax base (PBT). The PBT is the preferred profit measure to 
compute Amount A. Operating with different accounting standards is not preferable. The 
OECD has also stated that it will implement loss carry-forward rules. A company that had a 
negative net operating income one year will be able to reduce its tax liability in the following 
years since they “carry their loss forward”. 
 
Second, through an analysis of routine and non-routine profits, the total amount is split into 
x %, the deemed routine profit and y %, the deemed non-routine profit. The OECD has said 
that the residual profit used for Amount A will be the result of simplifying conventions 
agreed on a consensual basis.81The routine activities fall under the scope of Amount B and C 
based on the existing TP guidelines. The completion of step two shall not disturb the existing 
framework and shall function only as an overlay.  
 
The third step is to distinguish between different profits, for example, between trade and 
marketing intangibles. The legal difficulties in separating marketing intangibles from trade 
intangibles should not be underestimated. The definition of trade intangibles is “commercial 
assets other than a marketing intangible”82. A marketing intangible is" an asset used in 
 
81 OECD (2020A) para. 10, footnote 10. 
82 The definition is from International Tax Review; Tax Reference Library No. 86 on the Intangibles 
2nd edition 
business operations that is customer-facing"83 or as referred to in the TP guidelines "an 
intangible … that relates to marketing activities, aids in the commercial exploitation of a 
product or service and has an important promotional value for the product concerned. 
Depending on the context, marketing intangibles may include, for example, trademarks, trade 
names, customer lists, customer relationships and proprietary market and customer data that 
is used or aids in marketing and selling goods or services to customers."  
 
The nature of the twining together of the trade and marketing intangibles may cause an array 
of disputes. It is, therefore, crucial that the MLI attempts to clarify the definition thereon. An 
example could be factors such as workforce and MNE synergies that could fall outside the 
definition of marketing intangibles because it could also include trade intangibles. In terms of 
the legal process of profit attribution, one will first have to split the income between trade and 
marketing intangibles and then amongst the different jurisdictions in which the entity 
operates. 
 
The last step within the FA method involves the separation of the market jurisdiction profits 
w % from the total deemed non-routine profits, v %. The allocation key (the nexus) allocates 
the profit to the eligible market jurisdiction percentual according to the number of sales. The 
nexus has already been discussed above.  
2.4.5. Summary 
There is still work left to be done concerning the profit allocation, regarding the tax base 
determinations, the quantum and the revenue sourcing under amount A. The OECD 
emphasizes the need to understand differences in accounting standards and business line and 
regional segmentation for the purposes of computing Amount A.84 
 
The four steps may prove to be complex for tax administrations and taxpayers, especially in 
determining the tax base and the OECD, therefore, wants to apply simplification measures in 
 
83 Op. Cit. p. 8 
 
84 See OECD (2020a) page 22 
this regard. The use of simplified returns filing could be a solution in most cases, where a 
more comprehensive report at any time may be requested by the tax administration.  
The formulary apportionment is not a new concept, but a highly criticised one. Limiting it to 
only a small segment might improve the overall efficiency of the system.85 
2.5. Other considerations concerning amount A. 
Amount A will also affect multiple jurisdictions, and often there will be no bilateral double 
taxation treaties. Since a company will have to adhere to two different systems, it is essential 
to avoid double or multiple taxations. In both cases, the most logical rule would be that the 
parent country is the primary tax authority responsible for auditing and raising enquiries and 
thus responsible for hindering double or multiple taxations. In both cases, the most logical 
rule, would be that the parent country is the primary tax authority responsible for auditing and 
raising enquiries and thus responsible for hindering double or multiple taxations.  
 
However, the credit-method might prove complex if an MNE has a broad tax profile. The 
traditional system was not established for Amount A; hence a solution could be to negotiate 
multilateral APAs. APAs provide solutions, but they are also quite complicated. The author 
notes that one must find a method where the surrendering State can get a deduction of the 
Amount A profit allocated to other jurisdictions, allowing for a deduction, that is more 
adapted to the new taxing rights. The exemption of taxes seems easier than applying the 
credit-method, since the surrendering company can merely reduce its taxable profits to be 
reallocated, and the Market States can increase their profits accordingly. 
 
The problem of the credit-method is that it is determined by domestic law rules on nexus and 
sourcing, with many domestic limitations. 86 If one is to apply the credit-method, the 
relieving countries must ensure that the market county tax allocated to a taxpayer in the 
country is eligible for credit. 
 
 
85 See Avi-Yonah (2010); (2019) for the same opinion. 
86 Section 16-20 of the taxation act 
There will also most likely be disputes on what the routine functions to be remunerated under 
the first two steps of the calculation. If countries apply different benchmarks, some countries 
might get more of Amount A than what they are entitled to. Amount C may interfere with A 
because as mentioned above, it is meant to complement Amount B, thus the scope is broader. 
Binding dispute resolutions are needed, but countries may look at this as a violation of their 
sovereignty. Any bilateral binding dispute resolution may also be treaty-based and not apply 
international law contrary to systems like, for example, the EUs, where an arbitration court 
able to interpret EU law, would be violating its autonomy.87 
2.6. Conclusion 
The new nexus rules will shift the principle of reference from physical presence to the 
principle of reference of active and sustained engagement. For ADSs the nexus will largely 
be based on sales, with a global and local threshold. For CFBs the nexus has not been clearly 
defined, but it is likely to also be on sales. The author suggests the VAT-system, as it has 
many advantages in terms of familiar practice and clear and consistent rules, especially when 
they are trading in goods. And the significant economic proposal, because it complies to a 
high degree with the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions. 
 
If the OECD manages to clarify the nexus of the CFBs, create a stand-alone nexus rule that 
does not cause confusion, design clear and administrable sourcing rules and fix the 
overlapping possibility between CFBs and ADSs by defining at least which nexus rule that 
should be applied, the project might have success. 
 
There remains work on the legal parameters, more specific on the differences between CFBs 
and ADS. The revenue and profit threshold must be so to avoid the problematic issues of 
businesses that have a negative net income, but a sizeable gross income, still having to pay 
taxes. Then there are the new nexus rules and treaties that must be harmonised. Last, there is 
the requirement of revenue-sourcing rules.  
 
87 See Eckes (2018) https://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/03/13/dont-lead-with-your-chin-if-member-
states-continue-with-the-ratification-of-ceta-they-violate-european-union-law/ [accessed the 1st of 
June] 
Chapter 3 
3. Limited tax liability – foreign enterprises tax liability to 
Norway 
3.1. The taxation act 2-3 (1) letter b 
3.1.1. Interpretation of Taxation Act 2-3 (1) letter b 
According to section 2-3 (1) letter b, non-resident companies in Norway may still be liable to 
pay taxes on “wealth in, and income from, business activities, which... it is engaged or 
participates, and which take place in this country or are managed from this country...”. 
 
The paragraph is built on the source taxation principle, with the purpose of taxing income 
with nexus to Norway.88 
 
There are three conditions that cumulatively amount to tax liability. First, the non-resident 
company’s activity in Norway must constitute a "...business activity". Second, the business 
activity must be one in which the non-resident company is "engaged or participates". Last, 
the business activity must "take place [in Norway].” 
3.1.1.1. “Business activity.” 
In the taxation act, there is no legal definition of “...business activity”. The supreme court 
applies the understanding of the wording of section of 5-1(1) cf. 5-30(1) in an array of cases. 
It is also widely believed by many authors, including Zimmer89 and Berg-Rolness90 and by 
the ministry of finance’s interpretation statement91. 
 
 
88 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 34 
89 Zimmer (2017) p. 192 
90 Berg-Rolness (2009) p. 413 
91 UFIN-2006-38A 
In the interpretation of the taxation act, all former case law linked to the understanding of 
section 2-3 (1) letter b is relevant, since the taxation act of 1999 is meant to have the same 
content of the old section 15-1 letter c.92 
 
In the preparatory text, it is written that "one must perform a discretionary assessment of 
whether these economic activities have been performed over a period and had a certain 
extent, been performed at the risk of the taxpayer himself and objectively considered as 
profitable".93 The preparatory texts state that the period and extent cannot be constituted by 
individual transactions.94 Furthermore, it must be performed at the taxpayer’ risk. The 
taxpayer must bear the risk of winning or losing, and the business activity must be performed 
by himself or others that can be identified with him. 
 
As the last requirement, they must have an economic character and objectively be capable of 
generating a positive net income. The wording of this excludes subjective motivations. It 
does not exclude a temporary negative income, but it must be capable of generating a positive 
net income in the long run.95 
 
Economic activity must also be delimited towards activities that are non-economic 
(recreational activities). The activity does not have to be entirely economic in its entirety 
because most activities will have shared purposes. If the importance of economic activity is 
disproportionally less than the importance of non-economic activity, it should not be deemed 
an economic activity. 
3.1.1.2. “Engaged [in].” 
The wording of “......engaged [in]” relates to who is performing the activities connected to the 
business activity. It requires a nexus between the activity and the engagement of the 
 
92 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 34 
93 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 38 
94 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 48 
95 The same interpretation is confirmed in Rt. 1985 p. 319 (UTV-1985-386). See: Tjomsland (1985) 
pp. 207-220 
 
company, for example, through the employees or anyone that can be identified with the 
company.  
 
It distinguishes between those who are engaged and those who are not engaged, functioning 
as an extension of the risk condition explained in 1.1.1. Those who take the risk will in most 
cases also be those that are “...engaged [in]”. 
3.1.1.3. “Take place” 
The wording of "...take place" only states a requirement of nexus between the business 
activity and Norway. Neither the preparatory texts nor case law gives a definite answer to the 
full scope of the ordinary meaning. 
 
The purpose behind section 2-3 (1) letter b96, was to collect taxes on all income with a nexus 
to the business activity herein. All income from Norwegian sources should be taxed 
domestically. Even though there is a nexus between income and Norway, there must also be a 
business here. 97 However, the preparatory texts are from the beginning of the 20th century, 
and all form of physical cross-border related business activity was scale with mass. 
 
No cases have explicitly assessed the tax liability of a company that operates from a server 
abroad providing services to Norwegian users. Case law is limited in scope.  
 
In one of the more relevant cases, HR-2015-2488-A, the question was whether the income of 
a leasing contract on a drilling rig was subject to taxation under section 2-3(1) letter b. The 
question was if the non-resident enterprise operated the leasing contract to such an extent that 
they should be tax liable for the income thereof in Norway. 
 
The management company had performed all the activities concerning the leasing business, 
but the foreign company had taken all the decisions regarding entering into a leasing contract. 
 
96 Ot.prp. Nr.5 (1909) p. 37 
97 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 38 
The majority concluded that since the management company only had performed auxiliary 
functions in order to manage the leasing, and the actual value was created by the signing of 
the agreement, the business activities had “[not] taken place” here. 98  
 
The author does not find any support to the interpretation of whether a business activity on a 
server abroad amounts to the fulfilment of the condition “...take place” in Norway in the case 
HR-2015-2488-A.First, the case HR-2015-2488-A has been criticised for its weak and 
inconsistent approach to the interpretation of whether a business activity “[took] place 
herein”.  
 
The author finds that the dissenting opinion argues more precise, as the majority seem to mix 
the condition of “managed” and “...take place”. The main reason to not find the company tax 
liable is that decisions at a superior level were taken abroad. But still vital functions in the 
managing of the business took place in Norway, through the management company. 
 
Furthermore, the majority used case law that did not directly support its arguments. The case 
of HR-2000-327“Safe Services” did not directly concern the condition” take place”, but 
rather the condition “engaged [in]”. In HR-2011-1309-A the question was rather whether 
some of the income on the Norwegian continental shelf should be re-allocated to the head 
office in Switzerland, thus be exempted from Norwegian taxation cf. the petroleum taxation 
act section 2, cf. section 1. 
 
The supreme court in HR-2015-2488-A draws a line between core and auxiliary 
activities.99This distinction is also found in the MTC, to separate activities which amount to a 
business having PE and those that do not. A core activity is understood as an activity that is 
essential for the income itself, whereas an auxiliary function relates to supporting activities 
that do not directly lead to the income. Sales would be understood as core activities, whereas 
 
98 HR-2015-2488-A paras. 63 and 69 
99 HR-2015-2488-A para. 56 
mere storing of data information would not.100 The same distinction was also used in the case 
HR-2011-1309-A101. 
 
The OECD Commentary in paragraph 4.1 also adds to the fact that if the totality of 
preparatory activities amounts to core activities, they should be regarded as core activities. 
The MTCs distinction can be used a basis for further interpretation as it has some support in 
case law, although little weight for our question. However, with a careful approach, as 
Zimmer102 points out that the auxiliary functions do not represent a known tax term. If 
taxpayers are liable to pay taxes due to diffuse terminology, this will not harmonize well with 
underlying fundamental principles of taxation like predictability and certainty. The purpose 
of the Norwegian internal laws is to regulate the taxation of, for example, wealth and income 
of domestic taxpayers, whereas the double taxation treaties shall regulate the relations 
between taxpayers who are resident in one or both countries. The purpose of the double 
taxation treaties and the purpose of the Norwegian Taxation Act are, therefore, different. 
In part two and part three, the tax liability regarding non-resident companies in the form an 
ADS and a CFB that entire operate from a remote location will be discussed. Above, the 
author has explained that for business without a physical presence in Norway, that do not 
have a representative or management company herein, as in the case of HR-2011-2245-A 
(Dell) or HR-2015-2488-A (Odfjell), there is no answer given in case law. The ordinary 
meaning does not make precise the scope of the tax liability under section 2-3(1) letter b. The 
preparatory text states that an underlying principle is to keep the income in Norway, that is 
derived from a source in Norway. 
According to Eckhoff/Helgesen103, policy considerations/decision are important when the 
preparatory text is clear, but the ordinary meaning is vague or cannot be interpreted clearly. 
The principle of legality on the field of taxation limits the scope of extensive interpretations, 
but less of specifying interpretations. This is directly linked to the principle of predictability 
 
100 OECD Art 5(4) 
101 HR-2011-1309-A para. 42 
102 Zimmer (2017) p. 245 
103 Eckhoff/Helgesen (2001), pp. 73, 79 and 83 
and that a company shall be able to understand his tax liability by reading the law, in 
coherence with the preparatory text, to which it is subject.104 
3.1.2. Limitations imposed on the taxation act 2-3(1) letter b 
The most critical limitation to the Taxation act is the double taxation treaties. Also, the EEA-
agreement can limit the scope of the Norwegian taxation law on a governmental level. Due to 
the dualistic principle, the limitations imposed on the Norwegian taxation act binds the 
legislative powers of the Norwegian authorities so that they must avoid legislation that 
violates these regulations. Any violation of the EEA-agreement, on the other hand, can lead 
to several issues. 1) The EFTA surveillance authority (ESA) can initiate a treaty lawsuit 
based on the violation. 2) Citizens can plead a case by applying the EEA-agreement directly. 
 
In GATS 1995, the principles of national treatment (NF) and most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN) restrict a too-far-reaching liberal tax policy. The two latter restrictions mostly exist at 
a governmental level, as the availability to plead for a citizen is limited.105 
 
3.2. Automated digital services tax liability under 2-3 (1) 
letter b. 
The overall question is if non-resident ADSs are liable to pay taxes in Norway for income 
earned herein, when they have no physical presence here cf. section 2-3 (1) letter b. 
 
More specifically, if the ADS that operate remotely from abroad is liable to pay taxes on 
“income from, business activities, in which [... ] it is engaged or participates, and which take 
place in this country or are managed from this country” cf. section 2.3 (1) letter b. 
 
The business activity of an ADS takes place on a server, installed with programs of 
algorithms that process requests such as transactions and other user-operations, that collect 
 
104 HR-1990-142-A, p. 1297 in UTV-1991-153. 
105 See Folkvord, Furuseth, Ferdowsi, and Gjems-Onstad (2018) 
data from platform-interacting users. Based on this stored information, the ADSs provide a 
standardised service to a large population of customers or users in the jurisdiction based on 
demand.  
 
The author will focus on the sale of services through a server that is not located in Norway. 
As mentioned above, there are three conditions that cumulatively lead to tax liability for a 
non-resident company. In the following part 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, the author will discuss if 
the income of an automated digital service derives from “business activities, in which the 
[automated digital service] is engaged […] and which take place in this country”. 
3.2.1. “Business activity” 
The first question is whether the sale of services through the remote server constitutes a 
“...business activity” cf. section 2-3 (1) letter b. 
 
The different possible business incomes are found in section 5-1 (1) cf. 5-30 (1) of the 
taxation act. Section 5-30 (1) states that “benefits gained from business activities include, 
inter alia, benefits gained from sales of goods or services”. 
 
Section 5-30 (1) explicitly states that the sales of services are a business activity. If we look at 
section 5-1 (1), “taxable income shall include any benefit gained from … business activities”.  
 
When an ADSs sells advertisement or cloud services to a customer in Norway, this is a 
business activity according to section 5-30 (1) and cf. section 5-1 (1) any benefit which is 
gained from business activities constitute taxable income. The preparatory texts, of section 5-
1 (1) state that the economic activities must have been performed over period and had a 
certain extent, been performed by the taxpayer himself and objectively be considered as 
profitable. 
 
The author understands over period and certain extent as a reference to the size of the 
business’ operation. According to the preparatory text, “individual transactions … in general, 
do not constitute a business activity”. 106 The sale of services fulfil both the conditions to the 
size of the business operation, as it normally is performed over a long period of time through 
a formula of standardization, where consumers in Norway can, for example, buy ads by 
offering Facebook or Google an amount and they advertise within the frame of the 
consumers’ budget. 
 
Moreover, it must be performed at the taxpayer’s risk. This is understood as to who carries 
eventual losses for contractual disagreements or failed sales. Other risk-related activities such 
as marketing are replaced using data collected by platform-interacting users. The algorithm 
performing this service is created through R&D activities of the company. Part of the risk 
has, therefore, already been taken during the development of the algorithms. 
 
Third, the activities performed must objectively be considered as profitable and be of an 
economic character. The sale of advertising or other services provided through algorithms or 
some human interaction is more than capable of generating profit. The business conduct of 
the ADS relates to activities such as contract signing, payment transfer, R&D development of 
the algorithms and the collection and exploitation of data and user information. Even though 
some of these activities can be regarded as having another end-purpose, such as improving 
the platform or using the data information to tailor the user experience, they also have an 
economic purpose. 
 
Since the sale of services online is being performed over a period and has a certain extent, is 
a risk taken by the ADS and may be considered as profitable and of an economic character, 
the conclusion is that the sale of digitalised service through the server constitutes a 
“...business activity” cf. section 2-3(1) letter b, cf. 5-1(1), cf. 5-30(1). 
 
106 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 48 
3.2.2. “...engaged [in]” 
The next question is whether the ADS is “...engaged [in]” the sale of services from the 
remote server(s). 
 
There must be a nexus between the sale of services and the ADS, for example, if the sale is 
performed by the company’s employers constituting a direct and clear link. However, in other 
cases, it can be performed by algorithms that are directly linked to the R&D development of 
the parent company, but only indirectly linked to the company placed in Europe, that 
normally leases the IP property.  
 
Since the risk is taken by the company, also when it uses algorithms to perform transactions, 
there is a nexus between the activity and the engagement of the company that performs the 
sale. If a company could develop an algorithm, lease it a third party and the third party could 
claim that it does not engage in the activities performed by the software because all the risk 
was taken in the parent country under the research and development of the algorithm, this 
would be a way to avoid taxes in every country, but the residence country. 
 
Since the sale of services are performed direct or indirectly by the company, that interacts 
with customers in Norway, the ADS performing such activities is “...engaged [in]” the sale of 
services from the remote server(s). 
3.2.3. “which take[s] place” 
The last question is if the sale of services to customers in Norway from a remote server 
“take[s] place” in Norway cf. section 2-3 (1) letter b. 
 
The above-defined scope of section 2-3 (1) letter b in part 1.1 under the subparagraph “...take 
place”, concluded that this condition requires a certain amount of physical presence to fall 
under the scope. This will make all non-resident enterprises operating from a server abroad 
not liable to pay taxes in Norway, because the only nexus between them and the customers in 
Norway, is the transactions or contracts concluded in another jurisdiction. 
 
The ordinary meaning of “take place” is vague and does not offer any solution to the 
problems of whether sales of services from a server located abroad shall be considered to 
“...take place” here. 
 
The business income of the ADS has a direct source in Norway, as it is derived from 
customers residing in Norway. The legislator’s intention manifested in the preparatory text of 
1997-1998107 and the old preparatory text of 1909108 both underline the importance to collect 
taxes of all income with a nexus to any business activity here.  
 
The purpose behind section 2-3 (1) letter b calls for an interpretation, where the focus is on 
the value creation, according to “all income with a nexus to the business activity here”. With 
such a clear statement in the preparatory text, it could be understood as such that source 
deriving from Norway stays in Norway, regardless of its physical presence. 
 
Since neither the ordinary meaning nor the preparatory texts strictly disapprove of such an 
understanding, that digital sales activity from abroad is to be excluded, the question is 
whether to follow the preparatory texts that seem to legitimate the taxation of all income with 
a source herein or the case law and scholarly opinions that seem to gather around the notion 
of physical presence? The author will here attempt to find the rule with the best material 
content, that complies with the “underlying” purpose of the taxation act, and that harmonises 
best with the system.  
 
The question in the further is we can specify the interpretation of the taxation act section 2-3 
(1) letter b to make non-resident companies selling services from abroad tax liable.  There 
must be a proportionality between goals and means, and the security under the law of the 
citizens must be safeguarded.  
 
107 Ot.prp. Nr. 86 (1997-1998) p. 38 
108 Ot.prp. Nr. 5 (1909) p. 37 
 
First, it is reasonable that a business that generates high values on their substantial userbases 
in a jurisdiction should pay for the infrastructure that allows them to earn this amount of 
money. The value is created in Norway, through the end-users interacting on platforms or 
initiating a transaction to conclude a sale.  
 
On the other hand, it might be unpredictable and cause tax uncertainty if a country has vague 
tax rules that are not entirely clarified by the laws and the preparatory texts, and the case law 
offers no elaboration of the existence of an absolute requirement of physical presence. The 
principles of taxation, such as certainty and predictability, resist such a specifying 
interpretation. 
 
If the rule is understood so that all businesses with income from Norway are tax liable to 
Norway without also changing the double taxation treaties as such, this might create conflicts 
where Norwegian tax authorities will claim that a business is tax liable, but where the double 
taxation treaties are still applying the PE nexus. This is what has happened in Australia, the 
UK and other countries where they introduced digital profits taxes with nexus and profit 
allocation rules that deviated from the bilateral agreements of the countries. 
 
The interpretation of “take place” to also scope the non-resident businesses that operate from 
abroad without a physical presence here is not a good rule. The laws should be changed and 
not interpreted evolutionarily. 
 
Sale of automated digital services by a non-resident company without any physical presence 
in Norway does not fulfil the condition of “...tak[ing] place...”. 
 
The conclusion is that non-resident automated digital services are not liable to pay taxes in 
Norway for income earned in Norway, when they have no physical presence here cf. section 
2-3(1) letter b. 
3.3. The need for changes of Norwegian law 
3.3.1. Introduction 
If the in-scope businesses are not tax liable under the domestic law, the tax treaty cannot 
repair this. In many countries such as the UK, Hungary, India, Australia and Italy, they 
implemented domestic laws to scope the profits from businesses without a physical presence. 
Norway did not want to partake on this wave of unilateral measures and stayed calm, but the 
political parties have expressed their will to establish a committee that will review the 
Norwegian tax rules to find a solution. Others that have attempted to find a solution is Petter 
Stordalen. The suggestions cannot be treated in full, so the author will try to give a brief 
overview. In part 3.3.2 the author will look at the suggestions on how to formulate the laws 
so that ADS and CFBs become in-scope, in 3.4 the author will summarize, in 3.5 a general 
conclusion in terms of what to expect from OECD till the end of 2020 and which position 
Norway should take. 
3.3.2. Petter Stordalen’s amendment bill 
Petter Stordalen has proposed to the committee of finance that:109 
I) There should be a two to five per cent fee on the revenue income of online advertisements, 
sharing economy websites and exploitation of data and information. The threshold is at 50 
million kroner. There should also be exceptions for companies with a negative revenue 
income.  
II) A 25 per cent tax on income from real estate in Norway with the possibility of registering 
and decreasing the tax to a net value of 22 per cent. This will make companies as Airbnb tax 
liable in Norway. Companies should be able to demand tax exemption in their own home 
country to avoid double taxation. 
If we look at I, this can give Norway a right to tax businesses without physical presence that 
operate from a remote server abroad, but that have a large user base in Norway. 
If we look at II, it is supposed to make businesses like Airbnb tax liable.  
The author has the following questions regarding the proposal: 1) What will be the condition 
for tax liability? Is it only based on a sales threshold, like in some US states? If the nexus is 
 
109 See: E24 - HeidiNordbyLundeMenerPetterStordalenTarFeilOmDigitalskatt [accessed 7 june] 
based on sales, Norway can have similar rules as in the tax treaty and, therethrough, it can 
benefit to a great extent of the large potential it has.  
 2) How should this law interact with the already existing 2-3 (1) letter b? If it functions as a 
stand-alone rule, what if a company also is liable to pay taxes under 2-3 (1) letter b? If the 
suggestion relates to the residual profits, what about the non-residual profits? 
How will they calculate that Company X has earned 50 million kroners in Norway? In any 
event, there must be filed simplified returns to assess the sales amount. Shall the companies 
track users? Then there might be GDPR issues if the information is stored, cf. article 5-1 of 
the GDPR. 
Regarding the second part, relating to the sharing economy, the author understands that 
Airbnb that offers a service connecting supply and demand on the market should have to pay 
25 per cent tax on income from real estate. This will scope booking.com, Airbnb and other 
like companies that connect the hotel with the customer. Proposal II might create 
overregulation concerning the bilateral tax treaties because if the tax is subject to taxation on 
different terms in Norway than in their home country, and the double taxation convention 
only approves the deduction of taxes based on what is derived from the double taxation 
treaty, it can lead to double taxation. 
In a sense, the proposal lacks a few elements and needs clarification, but is a step in the right 
direction. A similar amendment to domestic laws will need to be made because as shown 
above, the ADSs and CFBs do not fall under the scope of the taxation act section 2-3 (1) 
letter b. Due to lack of space, the proposal cannot be further scrutinised. 
 
3.4.  Summary 
The discussions above concluded that neither the sale of advertisement from a remote a 
server placed abroad nor the sale of goods in a market jurisdiction through the licensing of a 
franchise is liable to pay taxes cf. Section 2-3 (1) letter b of the Norwegian taxation act. The 
primary issue is linked to the notion of physical presence, found in the ordinary meaning of 
section 2-3(1) letter b cf. “...take place in this country...”, the preparatory text110, case law 
such as HR-2015-2488-A, HR-2000-327 and HR-2011-1309-A and scholarly literature 
 
110 Ot.prp. Nr.86 (1997-1998) p. 38 
dealing with section 2-3(1) letter b. The purpose of taxing all the income from the source 
country, also found in the preparatory texts111, does not remedy the notion of a strong 
connection to physical presence through a presence that can forward the goods or services 
that come from abroad.  
3.5. Conclusion 
The government should not implement interim measures such as the many digital services 
taxes (DSTs) that were implemented globally. These intended temporary measures pose 
impediments to international trade and barriers to international consensus, and the author 
believe it was correct of Norway to await the outcome of the solution. A problem with the 
(DSTs) is that many of them do not include a firm sunset clause, meaning that unless they are 
forced to remove them, they may uphold them. That may interfere with the consensus-based 
long-term solution regarding Amount A, B and C. Other alternative nexus rules to allocate 
additional profits to the market country, such as the UK diverted profits tax or the Australian 
multinational anti-avoidance law are examples of attempts to create nexus rules operating 
outside the tax treaty framework, challenging the stability and cooperative intentions of the 
international tax framework. The OECD has also identified unilateral measures as DSTs such 
as Indias’ equalisation levy 112, France’s turnover tax 113 and Italy’s levy on digital 
transactions LDT114.  
 
Once a consensus on the matters has been achieved, DSTs may be implemented in 
accordance with the design of the framework. The international tax system must be based on 
cooperation, coherence, harmonisation and justified policies that do not lead to burdens on 
multinationals companies and that increases the tax allocations of the market States. The 
OTFC-framework conditions lay restrictions on the principles on which one can found the 
international framework, but indirectly also on how Norway must develop its tax system. If 
the OECD framework fails, this should not lead to unilateral measures but rather as an 
incentive to continue the work towards standard solutions based on founded principles, 
instead of the need to increase the tax income. Principles of source and residence taxation 
 
111 Ot.prp. Nr.86 (1997-1998) p. 38 
112 See OECD (2018a) Box 4.3 
113 See OECD (2018a) box 4.6, para. 360 
114 See OECD (2018a) box 4.4, para 366 
would still offer guidance on the way forward, as they are the principles on which our system 
today is built.  
 
The author, however, does not believe that the members reach a consensus, even though there 
was strong support given on the design of pillar one in OECD 2020.115 Whatever the outcome 
may be, there is still a possibility of developing pillar two into a global solution to achieve a 
minimum’s tax. Pillar two has the advantage that it can be applied without any specific digital 
triggers. However, if States perceive these measures as a threat to their tax policies, then there 
will be no chance of reaching a unanimous agreement on this proposal. Norway, remaining 
the biggest challenge in the time to come. Before any domestic law legislations are 
implemented, the MLI must be signed and ratified by countries such as Ireland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands et al., that might not be in favour of reimbursing companies for the tax, which 
they paid to other jurisdictions under the new rules of the MLI.  
 
The US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin suggested that the implementation of pillar one should 
be applied at a safe harbour basis, in which an electing MNE group would agree to subject so 
Pillar one on a global basis. This proposal is currently being reviewed, with a focus on 
administrative and legal questions related to the approach. 116 The new pillar would, 
therefore, only be applied at an MNE to see the legal effects, increased or decreased revenues 
in a jurisdiction and so forth. The suggestion might have a positive effect on countries that 
are afraid of the consequences that pillar one would have on their tax revenues.  
 
Even though there are many considerations to consider, it would also be wise to draft 
legislation while awaiting the consensus solution. The new changes should be made effective 
both at a treaty level and a domestic level at the same time in order to make the MLI 
effective. The problem is, however, that there are vital interests in determining how tax 
MNEs. The States in which, the highly digitalised companies are located, are afraid of losing 
tax revenue if they agree to targeted taxation of this income in the Market State. States with 
 
115 See (OECD 2020) para. 1 
116 OECD (2020a) para. 90 
substantial user masses, but few or fewer digital enterprises, are hesitant to let go of the same 
taxable income. 
 
The structural changes of international tax law and the shift of taxing rights from the 
residence State to the market State are drastic. Amount A will scope the highly digitalised 
businesses models without physical presence, introducing a new phenomenon and a 
gamechanger in International tax law. 
 
For Norway it is vital to remember that we are facing something new in the discussion of the 
new era of digitalisation and how it affects the tax income of some States. The reforms are 
not about increasing the taxable base, but allocating better the taxable base, to where the 
value is created. Whatever the developments are, it is critical that a business must be taxed 
once and only once. The nexus and the profit allocation rules, that will ensure this must also 
be in the spirit of the foundation laid down by the Ottawa taxation Framework and general 


















The degree of compliance of the user participation (USP), marketing intangibles proposal 
(MIP) and significant economic presence (SEP with the Ottawa taxation framework, as an 
overview of what the OECD has managed to achieve, and its current status. The USP and 
MIP are mentioned as a reference to understand better the balances that have been made and 
how the OTFC must be an underlying principle. One minor weakness in the figure, is that it 
only looks at Amount A and not at Amount B and Amount C as a whole. The reason for this 
is that Amount B and Amount C are meant to scope baseline activities, whereas Amount A, 
USP, MIP and SEP are meant to tax the profits of non-resident companies without physical 
presence in the Market State. 
 
117 Taken from https://francity.com/about-franchising/types-of-franchises/ [Accessed 7 of June] 
The idea to make such a diagram of arguments giving them weight came from a document 
that was written by the IBFD (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation) to the public 
consultation document of 2019b). They divided the categories in to three, based on USP, MIP 
and SEP. I have worked on my arguments and developed the diagram to also include Amount 
A.  
 
There are 4 degrees of compliance. 
Green = Compliance with the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions 
Yellow = Possible compliance with the OTFC 
Orange = Possible non-compliance with the OTFC 
Red = Non-compliance with the OTFC. 
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